The following is the translation of an Arabic article.
The
origin in respect to the meaning of “At-Tabanniy” (adoption) is the taking or
adoption of the son and it has been used in a metaphorical manner to refer to
the taking or adoption of the opinion. It is therefore said for example that:
“Tabannaa Zaid Fikran” (Zaid adopted an idea or thought) i.e. that he took a
thought for himself making it his. Within the context of the Ahkaam
Ash-Shar’iyah it is said that “Zaid Tabannaa (adopted) the Hurmah (prohibition)
of a matter or the Hall (permissibility) of a matter” etc… Meaning that he had
designated for himself a particular Hukm Shar’iy (ruling) from among the
numerous rulings. That “he took or adopted it as an opinion that he would
regulate his conduct with”.
The
intended meaning of “At-Tabanniy” (adoption) in this study, is that meaning
which is held by a group in this current time of ours. That is in the case
where they say: “The Ameer (leader) of the Jamaa’ah is the one who adopts
specific Ahkaam Shar’iyah for the group from amongst the numerous Ahkaam, which
the Mujtahideen have held, or as a result of a new Ijtihaad that he has made”.
Then, if he adopts a particular Hukm Shar’iy from amongst the Ahkaam, then his
opinion becomes the opinion of the Jamaa’ah (group) as a whole and every
individual of the group must concede and give up his own opinion to adopt his
opinion, and even if that is definitely contrary and opposed to their own
convictions.
They
also made that a right belonging to the Ameer of the Jamaa’ah in respect to
intellectual, political and administrative opinions just as they did in
relation to the Shar’iyah opinions. Therefore, any opinion that the Ameer
adopts, it becomes obligatory upon all of the individuals of the group to
adhere to it in word and deed, and to step down from or give up his own opinion.
They do not even accept within their membership the one who does not accept
this thought and will also expel from their ranks the one who violates any
opinion that the Ameer of the group has adopted and even if he definitely
viewed the error of the Ameer’s opinion, as mentioned previously.
They
used as evidence for that the Ijmaa’ As-Sahaabah, may Allah be pleased with
them, as they say. They said: “Some of the Sahaabah stepped down from or gave
up their opinion for others and so for example ‘Umar stepped down from or gave
up his opinion to follow the opinion of ‘Ali, may Allah be pleased with them
both, and ‘Uthmaan would also do that. In addition, in the Bai’ah (pledge) of
‘Uthmaan, he stepped down from his opinion to adopt the opinion of the two
Sheikhs, ‘Abu Bakr and ‘Umar, may Allah be pleased with them, in order to unify
the word (i.e. for the sake of unity). And they said that this happened before
the sight and hearing of the Sahaabah and as such represents an Ijmaa’
(consensus) upon the permissibility of a person stepping down from or giving up
his opinion to follow the opinion of someone else”.
They
then listed specific cases or circumstances in which it is permissible to give
up one’s opinion, mixing or confusing between giving up an opinion or stepping
down from it and between changing the opinion when a stronger evidence becomes
apparent to the Mujtahid than the evidence that he had been relying upon. This
case represents the changing of the opinion i.e. cancelling the old opinion and
carrying a new one, but it does not represent the person stepping down or
giving up his opinion which he is convinced of due to particular circumstances.
In any case, what has been presented represents the summary of their opinion
and the most prominent of what they have said regarding the subject. That is
whilst this opinion of theirs represents a pure error and the explanation of
that will be presented in the following examination:
Difference
in respect to understanding the address of the Shaari’ (Legislator) has be
known throughout the life of the Muslims, from the era of the Nabi ﷺ and through the eras that followed it,
until our current day. However, this difference did not manifest a noticeable
negative effect during the era of the Nabi ﷺ. That is because if required, the matter
was raised to the Nabi ﷺ who would resolve it for those disputing;
either by way of approving of the opinions which were at variance with each
other or by specifying a particular view from them and resolving the matter.
That was in addition to that this occurred on a small scale due to the newness
of the era of legislation and the relatively small number of those who were
concerned with memorising it and understanding it.
However,
following the death of the Nabi ﷺ, the space for difference of opinion
expanded amongst those who were concerned with understanding the address of the
Shaari’ (Legislator) and particular after the number of Muslims increased and
the number of Fuqahaa’ and Mujtahideen increased along with that. As such they
differed in respect to one single Mas’alah (Fiqhiy issue) which reached the
level of opposites on occasions. In the case where the Hukm of Allah in respect
to a single person can only be one decisively, it became obligatory upon the
Muslim to specify for himself a Hukm from among the plurality of Ahkaam to which
he would adhere during his life. This represents the origin of “At-Tabanniy”
(adoption) in respect to the Ahkaam Ash-Shar’iyah. Taking into consideration
the disparity of the people in relation to their capabilities and concerns in
respect to understanding Islaam, they naturally ended up being divided into
levels:
The
First: Those who possessed the sciences (i.e. knowledge) of the
Shar’iyah which qualified them to understand the Hukm Ash-Shar’iy from the
Khitaab (address) of the Shaari’ (Legislator), without needing to refer back to
anyone else in respect to that. These were known as the Mujtahideen and the
Hukm of Allah in respect to them is what they arrived to via their own
Ijtihaadaat. They were of different categories and the Fuqahaa’ have held a consensus
(Ijmaa’) that it is not permitted for those to leave their own opinion which
they have arrived to, to adopt other than it, in the case where they believe
that their opinion is the strongest.
The
Second: These are those who have less knowledge than the
Mujtahideen, in the case where they have the capability to examine the
evidences and outweigh them in terms of strength. However, they are incapable
of deeply examining the related evidences to the Mas’alah that is being
investigated. Rather, they look into the issue (Mas’alah) the evidences of
which have been specified by others and these were known as the Mutabbi’een
i.e. those who follow the strongest evidence wherever it is found and are not
restricted to following any of the Mujtahideen. The Hukm of Allah in respect to
them is that which they is weighed by them to be strongest in relation to the
Mas’alah (Fiqhiy issue)/
The
Third: These are those who are incapable of Ijtihaad and of
weighing the strength of the evidences. The one who fell under this category
came to be known as the Muqallid ‘Aamiy (blind imitator). Usually most of the
people fall under this category and particularly when the thought has declined,
the sun of Islaam has set (disappeared i.e. the Islamic society and rule) and
as a consequence the Deen has weakened amongst the people and with that their
concern for it and for its sciences or knowledge has also diminished and
weakened. The Muqallid Al-‘Aamiy, like the rest of the Muslims has been
addressed with the address (Khitaab) of Islaam and it is necessary for him, so
that he can adhere to Islaam in his life, to specify a single Hukm from the
plurality of Ahkaam to adhere to and regulate his conduct by. Because he is
incapable of that, he relies completely upon other than him in respect to
becoming knowledgeable about the Hukm (ruling) of Allah in respect to him,
although it is not permissible for him to imitate and follow an opinion which
he is not at ease or confident with.
However,
this ease does not refer to his mood or desires and whims which he follows.
Rather, it must be based upon confidence or trust in respect to the Taqwaa and
level of knowledge. It is therefore obligatory upon the Muqallid Al-‘Aamiy to
exert his effort to become aware of the one who has the most Taqwaa and
knowledge from among the Mujtahideen. If he then assures himself in respect to
one of them and his breast is opened to him, it becomes obligatory upon him to
imitate him and no one else, whilst it is not Halaal to move away from
following him to another unless his conviction changes.
It is
permissible for him to make Taqleed (imitation) to more than one Mujtahid from
among the Mujtahideen and it is not a condition that he imitates one of them in
everything that he says. That is because the effort that he has expended in
relation to becoming aware of the Taqwaa and knowledge level could lead him to
the conclusion that Abu Haneefah, for example, is most knowledgeable in the
area of Mu’aamalaat (societal transactions and interactions) whilst Ibn Hanbal,
is the closest to the truth in respect to the ‘Ibaadaat, and so on … If he came
to hold such a conviction, then he would imitate every Imaam he believed to be
closest to what is correct. That is because it is not taken for granted for
there to exist a particular person who is the most knowledgeable in every
matter after the Nabi ﷺ, and if that was possible, it would be
extremely rare.
This was
indicated to in his Hadeeth ﷺ which was related by Ahmad, Ibn
Maajah, At-Tirmidhiy and An-Nasaa’iy, in which it was mentioned: “And the
most knowledgeable of them in respect to the Halaal and the Haraam is Mu’aadh
Bin Jabal, the most well-read of them in respect to Kitaab of Allah is Ubayy
and the most knowledgeable of them in respect to the Faraa’id (i.e. rules of
inheritance) is Zaid Bin Thaabit”. Such a Hadeeth does not represent a
historical narration to be taken for mere pleasure, but rather it represents a
directing from him ﷺ, for the one who is ignorant of a matter,
from those mentioned, to be directed to the one whom the Nabi ﷺ specified to be most knowledgeable in
respect to that matter.
This
indicates explicitly to that a Zaid (i.e. particular person), from amongst the Mujtahideen,
could be more aware than others in respect to a particular matter, despite the
capability of others to provide an opinion in relation to it. This represents a
matter which is comprehended by anyone who has the minimal knowledge of Fiqh
and the reality of the Fuqahaa’. Therefore, the claim to follow one Mujtahid in
every matter always, is not correct. Following a single Mujtahid is permitted
just as it is permissible to follow more than one Mujtahid. The matter returns
back to the condition or reality of the one being imitated or followed. He (the
Muqallid) could trust or be confident that a particular Zaid from the
Mujtahideen has the most Taqwaa and is the most knowledgeable in every matter,
just as his confidence could in respect to the Mujtahideen could differ in
accordance to the subject matter.
The
important matter in this issue, is that the Muslim, regardless of the level or
category he belongs to, is obliged to be at ease and assured in respect to the
Hukm that he is adhering to, whilst it is not Halaal (permissible) for him to
leave that which he is at ease and assured about, to adopt that which he is not
assured or at ease about. The Messenger ﷺ indicated to this in the Hadeeth related
by Al-Bukhaariy, that the Messenger ﷺ said to Waabisah when he came asking about
Al-Birr and Al-Ithm (righteousness and sinfulness): “O Waabisah, seek the
verdict of your heart and your Nafs three times. Al-Birr (righteousness) is
what the Nafs is at ease with and Al-Ithm (sinfulness) is what causes uneasiness
in the Nafs and wavering in the breast, and even if the people continue to give
you verdicts (i.e. that something is Halaal)”.
The Messenger ﷺ explained the necessity of making effort to attain comfort and
ease of mind when hearing the Hukm from anyone and to not suffice oneself with
the mere hearing of it. Exactly similar to this, is when the Muslim hears a
number of opinions in relation to a specific Mas’alah (Fiqhiy issue), as it is
necessary for him to be assured and at ease in respect to the one he is
imitating (in opinion). This (understanding) was acted upon throughout the
Islamic periods and none of the Khulafaa’ of the Muslims, upon their different
Madhaahib, thought about making the Muslims leave their opinions and follow the
opinion of the Imaam.
That was because the Mujtahideen and those who
followed and imitated them, had opinions contrary to the opinions of the rulers
in every time, whilst no ruler thought about making them leave their opinions
and adopt his. So we have the example of ‘Umar and ‘Ali in addition to the rest
of the Sahaabah, may Allah be pleased with them all, holding opinions which
were contrary to the opinion of Abu Bakr whilst he was the Khalifah, and he did
not make them leave those opinions. The disagreement between Bilaal and ‘Umar
Ibn Al-Khattaab, may Allah be pleased with them, is well-known and famous, to
the point that ‘Umar made the Du’aa: “O Allah suffice me with Bilaal and his
companionship”, whilst he did not think about making them leave their opinion
by force, “regardless of the need for that”.
And when one of the A’immah thought about making the
people leave their opinion and adopt the opinion he had adopted, he failed
miserably in that, just as what happened in the Fitnah (turmoil or trial)
related to the issue of the creation of the Qur’aan in the time of the Khalifah
Al-Ma’moon. This agitated the people, not because of its connection to the
Aqeedah, but rather because the issue was related to making a group of the
people leave that which they were at ease and assured upon, to that which they
were uneasy and unassured about. Therefore, had the attempt been to make the
followers of Ash-Shaafi’iy leave the opinion of their Imaam in Mu’aamalaat
(societal transactions and interactions) to adopt the opinion of Ibn Hanbal,
for example, then such an attempt would have met the same fate in terms of
failure, and that is evident.
As for the Khalifah adopting a particular opinion and
the submission of the people to his rule in respect to implementation, then
that is not considered to be the giving up of an opinion. The Daleel (evidence)
for that, is that it is permitted for the one submitting to the opinion of the
Khalifah, in respect to implementation, to teach the people with an opinion
contrary to that of the Khalifah’s. Indeed, it is permissible to spread his
contrary opinion amongst the people and account the Khalifah upon its basis.
Ash-Sheikh Taqiy ud-Deen An-Nabhaaniy explicitly stated that in his book
“Ash-Shakhsiyah” when discussing the adoption of the Khalifah. He explained
that it does not cover study and culturing. Consequently, if the Imaam
Al-Aazham (the greatest ruler, i.e. Khalifah), who has been appointed over the
people, does not possess the right to make the people descend from and give up
their opinion to adopt his, then by greater reason, that is not permitted for
the Ameer Al-Khaass (specific leader i.e. of the group).
As for the claim of the permissibility of giving up
and descending from the opinion because some of the Sahaabah gave up their
opinions to follow others, then this is also an incorrect claim and does not
cover the giving up of the opinion whilst believing it to be the strongest or
preponderant opinion. That is because this Riwaayah (report) is not Saheeh in
origin. Then, if we were to suppose its soundness, the Sahaabah did not used
descend from and give up their opinions to some others, in a permanent form,
and the fact that they descended sometimes and on other occasions they did not,
indicates that their descending was only due to a reason that called for that.
The most likely of possibilities is that they would descend from or give up
their opinion, when they were convinced that an opinion which they had heard,
was stronger. That is because, this explanation alone is in agreement and
conformity with the governing origin, which is to follow the Daleel weighed to
be strongest. Then, when they did not descend from their opinion, that was
because they were not convinced with the opinion that they had heard, and this
represents a process of outweighing, even if any discussion is not apparent.
That is because hearing the opinion of others and weighing it oneself, without
discussion, and his measuring of what he has heard, represents a natural matter
that occurs, and it represents a weighing process as we have discussed
previously and not a form of Taqleed. Included within this weighing process was
that some of the Sahaabah would give up their opinion for the opinion of
others.
As for what was related from ‘Abdur Rahman Bin ‘Auf
and his statement to ‘Uthmaan, may Allah be pleased with them, during his
Bai’ah: “I give you Bai’ah (the pledge) upon (the basis) that you rule by the
Kitaab of Allah, the Sunnah of His Messenger and the Sunnah of the two
Sheikhs”, then this does not indicate to what has been suggested in relation to
this issue. That is because the Ameer, any Ameer, whether he was a general
Ameer (like the Khalifah) or a specific Ameer (like the Ameer of a journey or
group), does not have to abolish what his predecessor has left in terms of
laws, when he assumes the position of ruling. It is permitted for him to keep
the matters and affairs proceeding according to what his predecessor had
determined and even if that was contrary to his opinion. It is also permitted
for him to abolish them and this is not regarded as stepping down or giving up
the opinion.
For it to be regarded as stepping down or giving up of
the opinion, it must be (in origin) obligatory upon him to regulate the
matters, including both those which have been passed and those which are new,
according to his opinion alone. Concerning this, if this was obligatory in
respect to the new matters, it is not obligatory in relation to those matters
which have passed. And as long as it is not obligatory upon him, then his
leaving of the past matters, as they are, is not considered to be a stepping
down. In respect to those laws, he is like the rest of the Muslims he obliged
to submit to them when they encompass him, whilst possessing the right to
disagree or differ with them in study and culturing.
The acceptance of ‘Uthmaan to the condition of ‘Abdur
Rahman Bin ‘Auf, may Allah be pleased with them, is understood from this angle
and not from the angle of bringing together the word of the Muslims (i.e. for
the sake of their unity). That is because, had it been for the sake of the
unity of the Muslims, then that implies an accusation against ‘Ali, may Allah
be pleased with him, that he refused to bring together or unify their word,
whilst it is very unlikely that he would refuse or reject such a matter. In
addition, the unifying of the word of the Muslims where it is necessary cannot
be perceived to be in Mubaah (permissible). It would either be Fard or Mandoob,
whilst ‘Ali, may Allah be pleased with him, did not fall back or tarry from
either of these two, and specifically in relation to such a situation as this
was.
In addition, the most important matter to be paid
attention to here, is that giving up the stronger (Raajih) opinion for an
opinion that is Marjooh (outweighed i.e. weaker), only occurs in the area of
the Taqleed (imitation) of the Marjooh, whilst the outweighed (Marjooh) is not
considered to be a Deen (i.e. valid worship) in respect to the one views it as
such. And the (legitimacy of the) like of this Taqleed (imitation) must be
established upon a Qat’iy (definite) Daleel (evidence) just as the definite
evidence has been established for the (legitimacy of the) Taqleed of the Raajih
(stronger preponderant opinion). That is because if it is not established upon
a definite evidence, that would mean that the Muslim would be undertaking the
action whilst being doubtful about the reward of Allah ‘Azza Wa Jalla for him
for undertaking it, and that represents a “Mumtani” (prevented) matter to
abstain from. That is because when the Muslim makes Taqleed (i.e. follows or
imitates) the Raajih (stronger or preponderant) opinion, even if is Zhanniy
(indefinite), he knows definitely (Qat’an) that Allah will reward him for it
due to the definite Daleel establishing that. The same must be present in
respect to the matter of the Taqleed of the Marjooh (outweighed or weaker), and
that does not exist, which indicates that the Taqleed (following) of the
outweighed or weaker opinion is not considered to be following the Deen.
All of this relates to the Fiqhiy perspective of this
subject matter. As for the practical reality of the issue of “At-Tabanniy”
(adoption), then whoever applies the least amount of examination will be able
to comprehend with ease, that the adoption which is meant to make the
individuals of a particular group adhere to a single opinion, is nothing more
than an imaginary thought, the application of which is impossible, whilst no
one apart from an ignorant or arrogant person would claim the possibility of
its existence. Let us examine the statement of the Messenger ﷺ, who was the purest in the tongue of the Arabs, which was
spoken to his companions who were the standard bearers of the Arabic language,
when he ﷺ said to
them: “None of you prays ‘Asr except in Bani Quraizhah”.
Let’s look at this statement and how simple it is, and
yet despite that, the people of the language “The Sahaabah” divided into two
groups in respect to understanding it, and had they spread out across the
horizons, who knows how many divisions they would become. If that is the case,
when what would we think when an Ameer of a particular Jamaa’ah distributes a
publication to the individuals of his Jamaa’ah about As-Sababiyah (causality)
or Mantiq ul-Ihsaas (logic of sensation) or the intellectual sensation, whilst
he is not the purest of Arabs and the individuals of his group are not the
Sahaabah? How much will those upon whom this publication was distributed be
divided? And if they are divided in respect to the understanding of much of
what is provided to them from the Ameer, then what is the value of adoption?
That is because the thought itself is an imaginary
fictional one which is impossible to be applied in reality. This is
particularly the case when you are talking about a situation where one person
distributes orders and thoughts to thousands of ordinary people. Is it possible
to envisage that they will be unified upon one single understanding for what he
said? Let alone, the situation when they are studying books and each studies
according to his understanding, whilst the understanding of the teachers
differs, the way they deliver to those receiving is different, and each of
those receiving understands what has been provided in a different or
contrasting way to his brother. Therefore, the adoption, if it exists in the
view of some, its presence is nevertheless theoretical and does not have
practical value. That is with the exception of some of the fundamental concepts
of the Jamaa’ah, whilst the unity upon them in origin returns to the conviction
in them and not to the reality of adoption.
In addition, the original position in respect to
adoption, is that it represents an argument against the one holding it and not
the opposite. That is because it dictates that the group stating it descends to
the opinion of others from the other groups for the purpose of unifying the
word and not the opposite. That is because, had the opinion been possible, then
the original position in respect to it would be for the one who is convinced of
it to descend down from and give up his opinion to adopt the opinion of other
than him. If, however, the group holds this, holds on to it firmly and demands
others to descend to adopt its opinion, then this in truth and reality,
represents the opposite of the matter and does not represent acting upon the
opinion or its application.
Examples of the claimed adoption is only when one
person descends from or gives up his opinion for the well-being of the
Jamaa’ah. As for the Jamaa’ah giving us its opinion for one person, then this
is a claim which does not exist practically at all. That is because it is the
Ameer who descends from his opinion for the sake of the Jamaa’ah (collective)
and not the opposite. In addition, adoption makes the door of those who hold it
narrow and does not expand to encompass except those who believe in it. So for
example, it does not expand to include the one who views the obligation of the
Niqaab for the woman, if those who hold adoption adopt the opposite.
By branching out upon this concept and upon the other
opinions that the group adopts, we will find many Muslims falling outside of
the Jamaa’ah (group), based upon the argument that they do not adopt what the
group adopts. Indeed, if we were to bring our time together with the time of
the Sahaabah themselves, we would find that many of the Sahaabah would not be
found suitable for membership of the Jamaa’ah (group), because they carry
contrary opinions to that which the group has adopted. And that represents a
calamity because had the door been left wide in the absence of adoption, it
would be wide enough to encompass every Muslim whose opinion is based upon
Islaam.
Also, the one who scrutinises the matter of adoption
finds that it weakens the Deen in the Nafs of the one who is subject to it and
tames his Nafs upon laxity in respect to Taqwaa. That is because when an
individual from a particular group sees that a certain matter is Haraam
according to the Shar’a, whilst his Jamaa’ah views that it is Halaal, and then
he adopts the opinion of the Jamaa’ah whilst being convinced of his opinion, he
will feel, in respect to his Nafs (self), that what he is practising is not
from the Deen. If such examples were to become numerous, it would have become
easy for him to abandon or give up any matter, because it would have become
deep-rooted in him that abandoning and giving up matters is permissible, whilst
the important matter in respect to him is that the opinion which he imitates or
follows has been stated by a Faqeeh from amongst the Fuqahaa’, whilst there is
no difference between that and satisfying desires.
Adoption also eliminates the creative and elevational
aspect which must dominate over the Jamaa’ah. That is because it makes it
restricted to one person and he is the one who possesses the right. As such,
anyone who arrives to an opinion contrary to the adopted opinion must discuss
it with the person possessing the right alone whilst he cannot broadcast it
amongst the individuals of the group or discuss it with them. And it is the one
who possesses the right alone who decides the acceptance or rejection, which
means that the elevation or progressive development is restricted and limited
to him alone.
The statement that the one under command had
participated in it through his research and examination is not correct and that
is because when the person attempts one time after another to convince the
person possessing the right of adoption and fails each time, does not find
except one of two matters: Either isolation/seclusion or thinking only in
respect to that which serves the opinion of the Ameer regardless of the
correctness or error. Each of these two matters is worse than the other, in
addition to the prevention or forbiddance of the discussion of a particular
opinion with others is Haraam according to the Shar’a. It is not permissible
for anyone to impose this upon the people, as we would then have made it
permissible for someone to not listen to others, and then it would only be fair
for others to not be permitted to listen to us. And if that was to happen, who
then would we carry the Da’wah to? And how will we make the people listen to
us?
The adoption also kills the spirit of ‘Ilm
(knowledge). That is because the movement within its sphere does not assist the
existence of ‘Ulamaa’ or Fuqahaa’. It should not be said that Da’wah carriers
and not ‘Ulamaa’ is what the Jamaa’aat (groups) require. That is because here
we have the example of the Sahaabah, may Allah be pleased with them, who are
carriers of the Da’wah and the most knowledgeable of the ‘Ulamaa’. They were in
the highest peaks of knowledge when they discussed An-Najaashiy at the
beginning of their period with the Nabi ﷺ. That is because, the natural free movement of the Da’wah
carriers contributes definitely to the generation of ‘Ulamaa’ and Fuqahaa’ at
an amazing speed, whilst the constraints of adoption limit its existence, if it
doesn’t completely eliminate it.
And finally, but possible not last, the adoption has
no market for itself except amongst those who are ready to be constrained in
their thought or do not possess an opinion to begin with. In summary, it is
worth picturing, as just one example, how it is possible for a person who holds
an opinion like Ash-Sheikh Taqiy ud-Deen An-Nabhaaniy, may Allah’s mercy be
upon him, to be regulated by the law of adoption, in the case where he was been
commanded and not issuing the commands himself.
It is true that the Jamaa’ah must have a thought which
it adopts, however this thought must not go beyond the thoughts that express it
so that others are capable and enabled to pass judgment upon it in respect to
it fulfilling the obligation or not. These thoughts do not go beyond its fundamentals
at all and do not include the branch Ahkaam at all. The disagreement of the
individual person with a particular group or his agreement with it upon a
branch opinion does not make him fulfilling his obligation or his
non-fulfilment of it, whereas his disagreement with it in respect to its method
or its objective, would by its nature represent a basis by which the fulfilment
of the obligation or non-fulfilment would be judged.
The perception that the group would collapse by the
abandonment of the adoption is an incorrect perception. That is because even if
its exists amongst some as a law, it nevertheless is non-existent from the
perspective of the reality or practically, whilst its non-existence did not
eliminate the group, nor did it change its colour. Many of the groups present
in the Islamic and non-Islamic world today have never had an adoption and yet
they are still standing and present. In addition, those who adopt the issue of
adoption also have opinions which are not adopted whilst no effect in respect
to what is adopted or not adopted appears when they interact with the people.
What then is the value or worth of adoption them, other than constraining the
people and the Jamaa’ah itself.
In conclusion, the adoption which compels another person
to describe the Mubaah with Haraam and vice versa, does not have a Daleel
(evidence) from Islaam and no Faqeeh has ever stated that it is permissible.
Indeed, it represents a lie, because if the description of the Halaal as Haraam
or vice versa, is not a lie, then what then is a lie? And if the Raajih
(stronger or preponderant) opinion requires a Qat’y Daleel for it to be
followed, then the need in relation to following the Marjooh (outweighed and
weaker) opinion, for a definite evidence, is far greater. Based upon this it is
stated that the adoption of the group Haraam to be imposed or to act in
accordance with or to call for.
The group which seeks to revive the Muslims must have
a strategy that encompasses all of them and particularly when it is working to
establish the Khilafah upon the earth and the Khilafah encompasses all of the
Muslims, whatever their colours (i.e. variations). It should not constrict or
narrow its door to a Muslim whose opinion is based upon Islaam and even if his
opinion differs to theirs. This is whilst much of the time the disagreement or
difference of some groups with others, due to the issue of adoption or similar
to that partisanship towards the opinion, was a cause for quarrelling, hating
one another and dispute, which is contrary to what the Ummah needs today in
respect to unifying its word.
Many of the lessons can be summed up in to statements;
that the secret of the power or strength is their gathering together to strike
the Muslims from one bow, whilst the secret of the weakness of the Muslims lies
in their fragmentation and division. There is no question that the thought of
adoption and similar to that partisanship to the opinion has had an impact in
respect to the fragmentation and division. Therefore, it is to cast out
division that we call you to O Muslims and for you to be one row or rank like a
firm building in the face of the enemy, and to accept that which the Rabb of
‘Izzah (might) has accepted from you in respect to difference in opinion. That
is because the secret to unity is the acceptance of difference and the
disbelievers have not united (against us) except because they accepted the existence
of such difference.
We are an Ummah, before the coming of which, the world
was upon one opinion: “The opinion of the King, Caesar and Priest”. Then Allah
favoured us with Islaam, accepted from us difference and made it obligatory
upon us to accept it, and so we came by the favour of Allah brothers, one
single row or rank in the face of our enemy, in spite of the existence of major
differences of opinion in respect to the branches, which reached to the
existence of fifty opinion in relation to one single Mas’alah, may Allah reward
the holders of all of those opinions. We are those from who emerged Bilaal “the
slave of yesterday” who would discuss his opinion with the head of state,
whilst none denounced that due to their knowledge that he was doing that which
was rewardable from Allah. It is not rightful guidance for Allah ‘Azza Wa Jalla
to reward a person for an opinion whilst we fight him for it.
If we do not return to how we were as an Ummah which
accepts difference upon the basis of Islaam and only reject that which is not
based upon or does not emanate from Islaam, then we will remain revolving in an
empty cycle; one generation following another without any result, whilst our
enemy grazes amongst us and our resources however and whatever way he wishes.
So let us accept that which Allah ‘Azza Wa Jalla has accepted and placed reward
upon and let us reject that which Allah has made Haraam, so that we return as
we had been to being the best Ummah raised up for mankind, all of us holding
firmly upon the rope of Allah, pleased with those whom Allah was pleased with
from our brothers and even if they disagree with us in respect to opinion.
Sheikh Abu Islam Yusuf Shaqeero, Palestine
